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Abstract 
We explore the impact of privatization and the entry of new firms on enterprise performance in 
Belarus, a transition economy in which reform and market-orientated institutional development 
has been limited. We hypothesize that private ownership will enhance company performance, 
measured in a variety of ways including profitability and capacity to export to the West, and that 
newly created firms will perform better than state-owned ones. Our work is based on a large 
enterprise level survey which includes state-owned firms, privatized companies and newly 
created enterprises. The data refute both hypotheses. We conclude that this is probably because 
the institutional environment has not evolved sufficiently from the socialist era to permit free 
competition and effective governance by new owners. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The literature contains numerous studies of how the transition process has influenced enterprise 
behaviour (e.g. Djankov and Murrell, (2002)). The focus has been on the privatization policies 
and institutional arrangements conducive to improved company performance (Estrin (2002)), 
and enterprise-level empirical work has concentrated on the more advanced transition economics 
such as the Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland (e.g. Frydman et al (1999), Claessens and 
Djankov (1999), Grosfeld and Tressel (2001)) or on Russia (e.g. Estrin and Wright (1999), 
Guriev and Rachinsky (2005)). In general, one observes a positive relationship between the 
impact of privatization on company performance on the one hand and the business environment, 
including property rights and the institutional framework, on the other (e.g. Sachs, Zinnes and 
Eilat (2000)). However, little attention has been focussed on economies that have been lagging 
in the transition process, though there are a significant number of them (see EBRD (2005)). An 
interesting way to test whether privatization and de novo entry can by themselves engender 
improved company performance is to analyse behaviour in economies where privatization has 
occurred but in which institutional evolution has been more limited. In this paper, we provide an 
example of such an approach by exploring the impact of privatization and new firm entry on 
enterprise performance in Belarus. 
  
Belarus is an economy with one of the lowest scores in terms of progress in transition, according 
to the annual EBRD Transition Reports. Progress has generally been poor across the nine areas 
of reform covered in the Reports, and even in price and trade liberalization, which is one of the 
most successful reform activities in Belarus, the recent rating of 2.5 is lagging behind all 
transition economies but Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (EBRD (2005)). In common with other 
transition economies, Belarus suffered a major recession at the start of reform (see Vinhas de 
Souza and Havrylyshyn (2006)). In 1995 (the last year of recession), GDP in Belarus accounted 
for 65 percent of its 1990 level, industrial output was 61 percent, and capital investments only 37 
percent,  though most prices had been liberalised, and significant progress in small-scale and 
some in large-scale privatisation had been achieved. During 1992-1995, despite many 
shortcomings, the creation of the new market institutions had started and, though macro 
stabilization was not reached, inflation was reduced from a 4-digit to a 3-digit level while a large   2
 
 
nominal depreciation of the Belarusian Rouble (BRB) between September 1993 and March 1994 
allowed for the recovery of exports.  However, especially from the end of 1995 onwards, 
progress in transition in Belarus became rather slow and inconsistent, and this was reflected in a 
reduction in the EBRD transition indicators, from 2.1 in mid-1995 to 1.5 in mid-2000 (see 
Savchenko (2002). The move towards a “socially-oriented market economy” became an 
officially adopted target
2, implying a transition path which in many respects undermined the 
previous reform efforts and led away from rather than towards a market economy.  
 
Economic policy in Belarus since 1995 has been aimed at increasing growth through managing 
aggregate demand. The environment was characterised in the mid–1990s by multiple exchange 
rates, a lack of free foreign exchange markets, negative interest rates, high tax burden, 
widespread quasi-fiscal activities and barter operations, and increasing final product inventories. 
However, GDP growth resumed in 1996 and was high in 1997-98 (11.4% and 8.4%), while 
industrial output grew even faster (18.8% and 12.4%) and investment expanded by 20% and 
25%. Rates of GDP growth in 1999-2002, in the aftermath of the Russia crisis, were more 
moderate, but growth accelerated in 2003 to 7% and further to 11% in 2004 with an even faster 
expansion of industrial output and investment. The exchange rate was unified in September 2000 
and, since then, macroeconomic policies have been gradually improved.
3 However, very little 
progress took place in the area of structural reforms and the business environment remained one 
of the most hostile in the region (World Bank 2003, 2005a and 2005b). The share of private 
sector in Belarus’ GDP in mid-2004 was only about 25 percent - the lowest figure out of all 27 
transition economies, equal to that of Turkmenistan. 
4 “Bottom up” privatization had run its 
course by 1993/4 and managers in state owned firms gradually gave up aspirations to privatize 
their firms and learnt to work in the “socially orientated market economy” and there were almost 
no privatizations of sound enterprises after 2000, but some firms that were performing badly 
were privatized (see World Bank (2005a), Istomina (2005)). 
 
                                                 
2 The government introduced in 1996 the “Main Directions of the Social and Economic Development of the 
Republic of Belarus” and other programs designed to increase economic regulation and to strengthen the role of the 
government in the economy. From that date, the government has regulated prices and foreign trade, while slowing 
down privatization and institutional reform. 
3 For the analysis of the differences in policies during the two growth periods see, Bakanova and Freinkman (2006), 
World Bank (2005a). See also Zheltkov (2005), Shimov (2005). 
4 EBRD (2004).   3
 
 
Our analysis is primarily based on the survey undertaken in 2004 which covered 402 enterprises 
in the industrial sector, out of an estimated total of around 2200 firms. The survey contained new 
firms (DNs) as well as state owned (SOEs) and privatized former state owned firms (PFs). We 
also draw on surveys undertaken by the Institute of Privatization and Management (IPM) in 
2000 and 2003. The paper has four further sections. In the second section, we outline the 
hypotheses to be explored and our specification of them for empirical work.  The findings of the 
survey with regard to enterprise performance are summarized in the third section and our 
econometric findings are contained in the fourth. In the final section we bring together our 
results and provide policy conclusions. 
 
2.  OWNERSHIP AND ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE 
 
2.1 Hypotheses 
 
There is a considerable literature on the relationship between ownership and enterprise 
performance, summarised in Megginson and Netter (2001) and Megginson (2005). Djankov and 
Murrell (2002) have provided a survey of the findings for transition economies. Rather than 
present these arguments afresh, we outline the relevant predictions of the literature for our work 
in two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Privately owned and privatized firms will perform better than state owned ones. 
Relative to state owned firms, private companies in developed market economies are 
hypothesised to have superior corporate governance via the role of external owners in 
monitoring managerial performance. Incentives for managers to act in ways that improve 
corporate value are also sharper because of managerial markets that reward efficiency and 
punish poor performance and payment schemes that align managerial and owners’ incentives. In 
private firms, monitoring of management can be made more efficient by competition in stock 
exchanges and with information highly transparent through share prices. There is also the threat 
of hostile takeovers whereby poorly functioning managers can be replaced through competitive 
bids by alternative management teams. Moreover, since bankruptcy laws impact on private but 
not state owned firms, resources can be allocated away from private firms that are inefficient,   4
 
 
but the absence of the bankruptcy threat in state owned firms can lead to soft budget constraints 
which hinder this.  
 
The process of transition has added several issues to the analysis of privatization. Firstly, it may 
matter how the firms were privatised. In Western market economies, privatization is almost 
always to the highest bidder, and either via the stock exchange or to a group of strategic owners. 
Hence agents able to generate the highest returns from the assets make the highest bids. 
However transition was associated with some major innovations in privatization methods, 
including restitution, so-called “small privatization”, management-employee buyouts, vouchers, 
certificates and a number of other methods of “mass privatization”. Different privatization 
methods can lead to a variety of owners and governance structures and therefore to different 
performance post-privatization (Bennett, Estrin, Urga (2005)). 
  
It may also be relevant to understand to whom firms were privatised, in the sense of the 
controlling ownership group. For example, if the dominant owners post-privatization are insiders 
- workers and managers - they may be less willing to restructure because their own jobs will be 
at risk. They may also be less willing to invest because this would dilute their ownership stake 
and hence their ability to protect their employment and other non-commercial interests. Thus 
one might expect insider owned firms to perform worse than outsider ones. However, it is not 
clear how to evaluate insider ownership relative to state ownership. Earle and Estrin (1996) 
argue that insider ownership may be superior to state ownership since cost improvements are 
reflected in the returns to the owner, giving workers and managers an incentive to improve 
efficiency. On the other hand, insider ownership might be associated with non-profit motives in 
the firm to such an extent that company performance will be worse than under state ownership. 
 
Finally, institutions are relevant everywhere in determining the impact of privatization (Djankov 
and Murrell (2002), Megginson (2005)). The benefits of privatization may fail to materialize if 
the institutional environment for the newly privatised firms is insufficiently developed to support 
the corporate governance structures underpinning private ownership. For example, the enhanced 
incentives for managers rely on the operation of either an Anglo-Saxon type stock exchange, 
with competing groups of private owners being given both the information and the authority to   5
 
 
intervene effectively in cases of poor management, or an effective strategic owner such as a 
foreign firm. Either form of governance relies on the key attributes of a market system being in 
place, including the rule of law, a commercial code which for example guarantees minority 
shareholder and debtors’ rights and a bankruptcy code (Hare and Davis (2006)). In an 
environment in which managers are more easily able to achieve their own objectives through 
rent seeking, or in which property rights enforcement is so weak that owners cannot prevent 
managerial abuse, for example tunnelling out assets (see e.g. Boycko, Shleifer, Vishny, 1995; 
McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; Johnson et al, 2000), privatization cannot be guaranteed to 
improve company performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2: De Novo (DN) firms will perform better than privatised or state owned firms.  
 
Privatization in transitional economies should improve corporate governance of former state 
owned firms if the appropriate institutional arrangements have been set in place, but even then 
progress may be slow because of legacy issues. In contrast, new firms will not face the problems 
of restructuring to the new market environment that is at the heart of the transition problem for 
SOEs and PFs. Being created from scratch, they do not inherit the structural problems - over-
manning, underinvestment, poor quality control, weak marketing and financial control and all 
the other difficulties - which beset SOEs and PFs (Estrin (2002)).  In many cases, the inherited 
structures, attitudes and organisational cultures of the old state owned firms were so strong that 
restructuring has been very slow. The selection process that determines the foundation of new 
firms may ensure that more market focused and entrepreneurial people will lead them from the 
outset (Estrin, Meyer and Bytchkova, (2005)). This implies that policy-makers seeking 
successful restructuring might be better advised to focus their attention on the encouragement of 
new firm entry (Kornai, (1990));  
 
2.2 Specification of Hypotheses for Empirical Work 
 
We can summarise hypotheses 1 and 2 in a simple equation,  
 
X = f (O, Z)                                                      (1)   6
 
 
where X is a vector of performance variables; O is ownership (three categories; SOE, PF and 
DN); and  Z is a vector of control variables. The hypotheses summarise our expectations about 
dX/dO. A number of variables have been employed extensively in the literature as a proxy for 
the Z vector i.e. to control for the factors other than ownership that might influence company 
performance. We briefly summarize the most important ones for our empirical work, 
commencing with company size. Large firms, which can exploit scale economies, may be more 
productive than smaller ones, especially in the industrial sector and size can also bring pecuniary 
benefits, for example lower inputs costs or higher prices because of monopoly power. We use 
the number of employees in the firm to proxy for size in our empirical work, predicting a 
positive relationship with company performance. 
 
Different sectors have different technologies, capital intensities and factor productivities, and 
may also have different market structures and price-cost margins. We therefore control for 
industry-specific effects with sectoral dummy variables and also include an additional variable 
for the intensity of market competition. Moreover, transition economies often have regionally 
fragmented markets, so that, even for firms in a given sector, demand patterns or market 
structures may vary according to geography, which we control for using regional dummies. We 
also discussed above the importance of dominant ownership (insider versus outsider) for 
company performance and we control in our empirical work for this using a dummy variable for 
insider (managerial) ownership. Since there is some evidence that foreign owned firms perform 
better in transition economies (Svejnar, Terrell and Sabirianova (2005)), we include a dummy 
variable for whether the firm is engaged in a joint venture. Finally, we control for managerial 
quality by including a variable for the duration of manager’s tenure in the company as well as 
for the Belarus institutional environment using the extent of barter in enterprise transactions.  
 
3.  ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE AND RESTRUCTURING IN BELARUS 
 
In this section, we use the Belarus samples to describe the characteristics of SOEs, PFs and DNs 
in Belarus and to analyse differences in company performance, in terms of a variety of 
quantitative and qualitative indicators, by the three ownership types; state owned, privatized 
former state owned firms and firms created de novo.    7
 
 
The Nature and Scope of the Enterprise Sector in Belarus 
 
There have been three surveys of Belarusian industrial firms. The first two were by IPM 
undertaken in 2000 and 2003 and cover 222 firms, 119 of them SOEs and 103 PFs. The most 
recent one was in 2004 and covers 402 industrial enterprises, out of an estimated total of 
between 2100 and 2300 industrial enterprises in Belarus. In terms of ownership structure, 23.1% 
of the 2004 sample were SOEs, 48% PFs and 28.9% DNs
5. The sample is a structured random 
one so as to ensure adequate representation of large firms
6. This is because the underlying firm 
size distribution is highly skewed; 42.6% of firms in Belarus employ fewer than 100 people, but 
only produce 2.7% of industrial output and provide 1.2% of industrial employment. We 
structured the sample by sector and size class to ensure adequate representation of the large and 
important SOEs and PFs in metallurgy, machine building, fuel, chemicals and petrochemical 
sectors.  
 
The characteristics of Belarusian firms in our sample are summarized in Table 1. We find all the 
firms to be major employers, especially the SOEs, and even DNs in our sample employ on 
average more than 140 workers. These numbers are quite large even by the standards of other 
transition economies. Thus Belka et al (1995) report that in early-transition Poland, SOEs on 
average employ 703 workers, PFs employ 1007 if they are majority state owned but only 594 if 
privately held, and DNs employ 111. The figures for Russia are similar to those of Belarus; for 
example Linz and Krueger (1998) report that firms in their Russian enterprise sample vary in 
size between less than 200 and more than 10,000 workers, though 80% of the sample is in the 
                                                 
5 SOEs are defined as enterprises whose legal status is “unitary state owned enterprise”, while former state owned 
firms are enterprises whose legal status is other than unitary state owned enterprise and which indicated that they 
had been established in the process of privatization. This category includes enterprises bought from the government 
and joint stock companies in which the government still owns a stake, including a majority stake. We later 
distinguish between firms that are controlled by the state or privately controlled in the sense that the state owns more 
or less than 50% of shares. All other enterprises are contained in the new private enterprise category.  
 
6 This approach leads to some bias in the sectoral distribution of the sample relative to the population. Some 17% of 
firms in the sample are in the energy, fuel and chemical/petrochemical industry as against only 6.5% in the 
population. However, these three sectors produce 42% of industrial output. Construction materials are also over 
represented; 12% in the sample compared with 5.8% in the population. This necessarily leads to under-
representation of the remaining industries. Thus, 26% of firms in the sample are in machinery and metalworking, as 
against 29% of the population; 11% in forestry, wood, paper and pulp as against 15.5%; 18% in light industry 
(21.2%); and 16% in food (22.1%). 
   8
 
 
size class between 2000 and 5000 workers. Earle, Estrin and Leschenko (1996) also find 
comparable employment levels in Russia; average employment in SOEs was around 3000 
workers (see also Ioffe (2004)). 
 
The proportions of sales that are exported are surprisingly low for what one might expect to be a 
small open economy: less than 30% of revenue. Unsurprisingly DNs export least - less than 20% 
of their sales - while SOEs have the largest export share at 28.7%. Table 1 also suggests that 
there has been little progress towards Belarusian integration into the world economy; exports to 
Russia and the former communist bloc predominate. Only one quarter of firms that export do so 
to developed western economies. Another sign that reforms have not yet taken root can be seen 
in the slow rate of managerial turnover. On average, managers have worked with their firms for 
more than 12 years, more than half of them in the top post. Unsurprisingly, managerial turnover 
is particularly low in SOEs, where the average tenure is nearly eighteen years, but also in PFs, 
where managers have worked for the firm on average for 12.4 years, the majority of them in the 
senior position. Even in new firms, managerial turnover is rather slow, with the average tenure 
exceeding seven years. Thus reform and ownership change has not been much associated with 
changes in management, even in privatized firms. 
 
Policy-makers in the transition economies had hoped that the introduction of new technology 
and the expansion of foreign trade could be spearheaded through foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and joint ventures (see e.g. Estrin, Gelb and Singh (1995)). However, in practice foreign 
investment has played no significant role as yet in Belarus’s economic development: FDI is 
negligible and only around 5% of firms are in a joint venture. The comparable figure for Poland 
in 1994 was 14% (Belka et al (1995). Interestingly, joint ventures with foreign firms are slightly 
more common among SOEs and PFs than DNs, perhaps indicating foreign firms’ preference for 
arrangements with larger or better connected enterprises or an institutional bias against DNs in 
the granting of licenses. There is also no evidence for the emergence of financial holding 
companies, as was occurring in Russia and which have come to be seen as a potential source of 
concentrated outsider ownership (see Perotti and Gelfer (2001)). Less than two percent of the 
firms in our sample are members of a holding group. 
   9
 
 
Turning to investment financing, there are important differences in the sources of financing by 
ownership type. De novo firms rely largely on retained earnings; only 36.2% of DNs (as against 
67.7% of SOEs) view banks as an important source of finance, and DNs are also much less 
likely to obtain subsidies or to exploit deficiencies in the property rights system by accruing 
overdue arrears. In contrast, former and especially current state ownership is associated with 
superior access to banks for loans, the possibility of selling or leasing unused assets and a much 
enhanced ability to obtain subsidy, government exemptions and preferences or to exploit soft 
budget constraints. Overall, some 39% of all firms in Belarus continued to benefit from some 
form of government concession, down from 49.1% in 2000. These are primarily tax concessions 
(15.9%), writing off budget arrears (13.7%) and targeted budget financing and subsidies (8.2%). 
However, these benefits are enjoyed by more than half of SOEs (51.6%) and 44% of PFs but 
only 21.6% of DNs. For example, writing off budget arrears has benefited almost 24% of SOEs 
but only 2.6% of new firms. 
 
In the socialist era, firms were also the basis for a significant share of welfare provision, and the 
move to a market economy has meant that the sale of social assets, the crèches, health facilities 
etc owned by the socialist enterprise is an important aspect of restructuring. Estrin and Schaffer 
(1997) undertook a study of such restructuring for Poland, and found that while, SOEs had only 
restructured slightly, there was somewhat more change in the ownership and provision of social 
assets among privatized firms. De novo firms, since they did not inherit such structures from the 
socialist period, owned very few social assets in Poland in 1995.Overall, the level of social 
provision in enterprises was found still to be quite high in Poland in 1993; for example 34% of 
firms provided childcare, 64% heath care, 52% housing or housing subsidies and 29% a 
cafeteria.  There was also considerable variation by ownership type; for example 48% of 
privatized firms and 65% of SOEs but only 3% of DNs provided housing or housing subsidies. 
Table 2 reveals that the levels of social provisions were still higher in Belarus in 2004 than they 
were in Poland in 1993, and that there has been almost no restructuring at all of social assets 
since the fall of communism in either state owned or privatized firms. There are some 
differences between SOEs and PFs in the structure of the provision of social assets; for example 
SOEs provide on average more canteens and day care centres. But the differences that existed in 
1991 between the firm types remain in 2004. The only area where there has been any significant   10
 
 
reduction of enterprise provision of social assets is in day-care centres and nurseries, but this has 
declined considerably in both SOEs and PFs.  The sample does not provide information on 
social provision in DNs. 
 
4.  ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE, RESTRUCTURING AND OWNERSHIP 
 
For firms in developed market economies one can identify several approaches to measuring 
performance. A common one is enterprise efficiency, often proxied by total factor productivity 
(TFP) or labour productivity. A second is profitability, measured by profits and usually 
normalised by some measure of firm size such as assets (profit to assets ratio) or sales (profit to 
sales ratio). However it is hard to use these standard measures of performance in transition 
economies because they require more data, especially with respect to capital, than are usually 
available
7. Hence, studies of corporate performance in transition have tended to rely on labour 
productivity, or alternative measures constructed to address the issues raised by the reform 
process (see Djankov and Murrell (2002)). Commonly used measures have included sales 
growth, employment growth and, given the importance of opening to the global economy in the 
process, export growth, especially to western economies.
8 
 
In the light of this, we employ a wide variety of measures of enterprise performance in our 
empirical work: 
1.  Measures of enterprise productivity and profitability - sales per worker (SL), and 
profitability (ratio of profits to sales) (PS). Since these are continuous variables and the 
data is cross-sectional, we use OLS estimation methods in these regressions. 
2.  Indicators of export performance. We use the export to sales ratio (EXP) and the 
expected change in future exports (DEX) and in exports to the West (DEX1). The latter 
                                                 
7 For example, TFP can only be measured if there are good measures of capital input, a variable that was poorly 
measured under planning and beyond.  Profits are also not good indicators of performance in periods of rapid price 
change and company information about profitability is often unreliable for political or tax evasion reasons. 
Deficiencies in the capital market also often  precludes the use of financial measures. 
8 The equation for employment growth must be interpreted differently from the others however. Faster output or 
productivity growth in a given sector in DN firms than privatised ones would be a consequence of better 
management but current and former state owned firms would almost certainly be over manned (see Estrin (2002)). 
Hence employment in such firms might fall whatever was happening to output and sales. In contrast, DNs are likely 
to have entered the market at or below optimal scale, and hence will have a positive correlation between output and 
employment.  (see Richter and Schaffer (1996)).   11
 
 
are limited dependent variables (taking the value of unity if exports (exports to the west) 
increased and otherwise zero) so we estimate using probit methods. 
3.  Indicators of changes in company performance; productivity change (DSL) and change 
in employment (DEMP). The former is a limited dependent variable (taking the value of 
unity if sales per worker increased) so the estimation method is probit, but OLS is used 
for the employment change equation
9.  
 
Our hypotheses concern the sign and significance of the firm type dummies; DN and PFs 
relative to SOEs in these seven performance equations. We also further subdivide the category 
of “privatized enterprises” (PF) to take account of the fact that some firms, which have formally 
been privatized, retain dominant state ownership. Thus while all former state owned firms, 
including those with majority state ownership, are denoted PF, privatized firms with majority 
private ownership are denoted PF1. SOEs are the omitted category in the regressions.  
 
As discussed in Section 2, we control for size of firms using employment (EMP) and for 
differences based on product markets using industry dummy variables.
10 We construct a dummy 
variable GEO for firms located in Minsk
11. We construct a dummy variable JV that takes the 
value unity if the firm is a joint venture, or has set up a joint venture. We control for managerial 
turnover with a dummy variable, LOS, which takes the value of unity if the manager started 
working at the enterprise prior to 1996. We expect performance to be enhanced in firms with 
managers who have served for a shorter number of years. Product market competition can put 
pressure on enterprises to improve their performance and we address this with the dummy 
variable COMP, which takes the value of unity if managers perceive domestic or foreign 
competitors as being a considerable or major influence on their choices. Since large insider 
                                                 
9 There is positive correlation between some of the performance measures. Productivity and profitability are 
positively correlated, and firms with higher labour productivity also have greater exports to the West. Productivity 
growth is strongly correlated with other measures of good performance, including high export shares and growth, 
including to the West. The improvement of exports to the West is correlated with SL, DSL, EXP, DEX, but not 
correlated profitability or employment growth. Indeed employment growth is not correlated with any other 
performance measures. Profitability is not associated with productivity, employment growth, or exports.  
 
10 Industry 1 is machinery and metalworking; 2 is timber, woodworking, pulp and paper; 3 is construction materials; 
4 is light industry and 5 the food sector. The omitted industry category is “other”. 
11 All other regions are the omitted category.     12
 
 
stakes can act to slow restructuring and improved performance, we include a dummy variable 
MAN, which takes the value of unity if managers are majority owners of the firm. 
 
At first thought, one might expect soft budget constraints to act to undermine enterprise 
performance, diverting management energies from satisfying consumer demands towards rent 
seeking. However, in a partially reformed environment like Belarus, where resources are scarce 
and capital markets underdeveloped, soft budget constraints may instead represent valuable 
access to financial (and political) resources and hence may enhance the performance of firms 
that receive them. We employ two dummy variables for soft budget constraints in our 
regressions; SBC which equals unity if the firm reports that subsidies or exemptions and 
preferences granted by the state are an important source of enterprise funding and SBC1 which 
equals unity if the state has granted the firm any of soft loans, targeted budgetary financing and 
subsidies, customs or tax exemptions, sale of foreign proceeds on privileged terms, soft 
settlement regime for energy payments or writing off unpaid dues to the budget. Thus SBC 
represents a higher level of subsidy than SBC1. 
 
We use a variety of specifications in our regression analysis because SOEs are typically larger, 
and DNs smaller than PFs. For this reason, we provide estimates that   both exclude and include 
the employment variables, columns (1) and (2) of each regression respectively.
12 The regressions 
are reported in Tables 3 to 5, with results for measures of business performance (SL and PS) in 
Table 3; export performance (EXP, DEX and DEX1) in Table 4; and growth performance in 
Table 5 (DSL and DEMP).  
 
We commence our testing of the hypotheses by exploring the relationship between productivity 
and profitability on the one hand and firm ownership types on the other in Table 3. The SL 
equation suggests that industry effects are significant in understanding productivity differences 
between firms, with enterprises in the timber, woodworking, and pulp and paper industry 
significantly more productive. Moreover, monopoly power is found to yield higher prices, and 
therefore revenues and sales per worker, since COMP is negatively associated with productivity 
                                                 
12 New firms are also concentrated in Minsk, and are more likely to have joint ventures, but this does not influence 
any of our results so we do not report regressions with these variables omitted.    13
 
 
and we find a positive effect from managerial ownership.
13 However, privately owned firms – 
both privatized and created de novo – are not found to perform better that state owned ones. 
Indeed privatization, when it takes the form of majority control being placed in private hands, is 
actually found to be associated with lower productivity than state ownership.  We also find no 
significant difference between the profitability of former state owned firms as a class, new firms 
or state owned firms. However, in a very poor equation, we find that firms that have been 
privatized fully (PF1) are more profitable.  
 
The regressions in Table 4 have a better fit than the performance equations.  Commencing with 
export shares, the regressions find that larger firms export more, have faster growth of exports 
and increase their exports to the West more. Length of service seems to be a (negative) indicator 
of managerial quality, in that export shares are significantly lower in firms in which managers 
were appointed before 1996. There are also strong sectoral and regional effects, with a base in 
Minsk being a significant disadvantage for all three measures of export performance. Export 
shares are also positively related to both measures of softness of budget constraint, perhaps 
indicating that firms may need to be subsidized to maintain high levels of exports. This result 
holds when we control for size of firm. There is also some weak evidence that firms in receipt of 
soft budget constraints may be increasing exports to the West faster. As in Table 3, the 
ownership effects in Table 4 do not for the most part support our hypotheses. Thus there is no 
evidence that privatized or new firms increase exports or exports to the West faster than state 
owned firms, though surprisingly new firms have significantly higher export shares.  
 
We consider the indicators of changes in enterprise performance in Table 5. The employment 
growth equation contains rather few significant determinants, with firm size, soft budget 
constraints and product market competition all proving not to be significant. There are also no 
significant effects from managerial quality or the presence of JVs. Indeed the only significant 
control effects are sectoral and via insider ownership.
14  There are no significant differences in 
employment change according to whether a firm is state owned, privatized or de novo,  though 
                                                 
13 The causality here is not unambiguous - managers may have taken ownership stakes in more productive firms. We 
are not able to explore this issue further in this paper. 
14Firms with managerial ownership increase and reduce employment more slowly. This is consistent with the view 
that insiders will act to slow the pace of restructuring   14
 
 
the category of former state owned firms in which private owners hold a majority stake do adjust 
employment significantly more than the other types of firm. The productivity growth equation is 
interesting in that soft budget constraints are again found to have a positive effect and length of 
managerial service a negative one. However, there are no significant differences between any PF 
and SOEs though DNs display significantly slower productivity growth. 
 
These equations taken together suggest that the determinants of company performance in 
Belarus, using a wide variety of indicators, are not for the most part those that are relevant in 
most other transition economies; the fits are poor and few “economic” variables are significant. 
However, we are still able to test our hypotheses about the impact of different firm types on the 
variety of performance measures. Hypothesis 1 – that privatized firms will perform better that 
state owned ones - is rejected in every equation: the coefficient on PF is never significant. 
However this may be because the state retains significant stakes in formally privatized 
enterprises. But when we separate out the group of privatized firms that have non-state majority 
owners, the findings are inconsistent, though a few significant effects from private ownership 
emerged. Majority private ownership of former state owned firms is associated with greater 
profitability and productivity growth, but lower productivity levels and less property 
restructuring. The results with respect to new firms in hypothesis 2 are even more emphatically 
negative. For the most part, new firms in Belarus are not found to perform any differently to 
state owned or privatized firms. However there are two contradictory exceptions; exports, which 
are greater in DNs, and productivity growth, which is found to be slower. 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our sample suggests Belarusian firms have made very limited progress in enterprise 
restructuring. We will focus on three aspects of these difficulties: the failure to integrate 
sufficiently into the world economy, the effects of soft budget constraints and the institutional 
environment for privatized and new firms. Studies of other transition economies suggest that 
foreign firms could have a very important role to play in enterprise restructuring. They can 
provide new technologies, and mechanisms to benefit from the global division of labor including 
export growth, capital investments and managerial skills. In Belarus, we find the levels of 
foreign direct investments and joint ventures to be low, and in our equations, we do not find that 
membership of a joint venture yields any benefit in terms of improved performance. This 
suggests that the policy environment is particularly unattractive to potential foreign investors, 
and that the Belarus authorities have much to learn about how to exploit joint ventures to the 
benefit of the host firms.  
 
Contrary to expectations, we find that firms in receipt of direct or indirect subsidy never perform 
significantly worse and sometimes perform better. One might interpret this result as indicating 
that soft budget constraints are effective in improving company performance. However, this 
conclusion is probably misleading. The Belarus economy has only partially moved in a direction 
of the market. Firms are financially constrained and financial instruments other than retained 
profits or sale of socialist assets are virtually non-existent. In such a situation, resources from 
any source may allow firms in receipt of them to improve their own performance somewhat. 
However, soft budget constraints also dull the incentives generated by the market economy, and 
their continued relevance in the Belarus environment may indicate why other variables proxying 
for market incentives in our equations are rarely found to be significant. 
 
The refutation of Hypothesis 1 suggests the Belarusian institutional environment has not yet 
taken a form that can sustain the operation of a market economy. For the most part, privatization 
is found to have no significant effect on a variety of aspects of company performance. This 
could be because the new owners were inappropriate, but the study does not indicate that insider 
ownership is the key issue. It seems more plausible that privatization is having no impact   16
 
 
because the new owners are not able to exercise effective corporate governance because of 
weaknesses in the enforcement of property rights, restrictions on the operations of product 
markets and softness of budget constraints. The extended length of service of managers in 
privatized firms also suggests that the new private Belarusian owners have not changed 
management post-privatization and this is indicative that ownership changes alone have not been 
sufficient to engender behavioural shifts. 
 
An equal worry for the future path of the economy is the refutation of Hypothesis 2 about de 
novo firms. Evidence is emerging that the path of institutional development between the former 
Soviet Union countries and Central and Eastern Europe is diverging (Djankov and Murrell 
(2002)), particularly in the area of property rights and institutions conducive to the emergence 
and growth of a dynamic de novo sector (see Estrin, Meyer, Bytchkova (2005)). Such 
institutions include a flexible capital market, a sound commercial code, enforcement of property 
rights, a limitation on rules and bureaucracy, especially for small and medium sized enterprises, 
and relatively low levels of corruption. The institutional differences with respect to the business 
and legal environment for new firms seem to be strongly associated with the rate of creation of 
new enterprises, and therefore productivity and economic growth. Our findings that new firms in 
Belarus are rarely in any significant way different from current and former state owned firms 
with respect to performance are contrary to the transition literature that identifies new firms as 
an important potential source of restructuring and growth. The results seem once again likely to 
be explained by the particular legal, institutional and business environment in which de novo 
firms operate in Belarus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   17
 
 
Table 1   
Characteristics of Belarus Enterprises 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Institute of Privatization and Management, 2004 
  Sample 
Average 
SOE PF  DN 
Employment (2004) (EMP)  594  1237  565  146 
% firms exporting to: -         
- developed economies  25.1       
- former socialist economies  35.1       
- Russia  70.6       
Share of exports in revenue (%)  25.8  28.7  28.0  19.1 
Years of service of general 
manager (LOS) 
12.1 17.6  12.4  7.4 
% firms with or in a joint 
venture (JV) 
5.5 7.5  6.2  2.6 
% firms which are members of 
holding companies 
1.7 -  -  -   18
 
 
 Table 2 
 Share of Enterprises Having Social Assets, % 
Form of ownership 
SOE PF 
Social asset  
1991  At present  1991  At present 
Canteen,  cafe  64.5 63.4 46.1 45.1 
Holiday center, 
recuperation center   22.6  20.4  12.4  11.4 
Cultural center, club  26.9  22.6  18.1  17.1 
Information and 
education  centers  5.4 3.2 4.7 3.6 
Residential  houses  47.3 44.1 30.6 32.1 
Sport facilities   20.4  21.5  13.5  14.5 
Health  facilities  43.0 45.2 23.8 23.8 
Day care centers, 
nurseries  47.3 18.3 28.5 11.4 
   Source: Institute of Privatization and Management, 2004 
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Table 3   Performance Equations: Productivity and Profitability 
  Productivity (SL)  Profitability (PS) 
  (1) (2)   (1)    (2) 
DN  0.022 0.017 -0.107  -0.061 
  0.203 0.154 -0.986  -0.519 
PF  0.106 0.104 -0.113  -0.143 
  0.811 0.786 -0.876  -1.068 
PF1  -0.205* -0.207* 0.182  0.261** 
  -1.828 -1.83  1.598  2.202 
MAN  0.194** 0.195** 0.029  0.033 
  2.154 2.152 0.347 0.381 
GEO  -0.045 -0.046 -0.013 -0.04 
  -0.565 -0.568 -0.161 -0.489 
LOS  0.045 0.043 -0.077  -0.078 
  0.591 0.548 -1.037  -1.013 
JV  -0.012 -0.012 0.065  0.042 
  -0.174 -0.162 0.933  0.588 
SBC  -0.052 -0.05  0.003  0.023 
  -0.663 -0.637 0.033  0.291 
SBC2  -0.095 -0.093 0.052  0.035 
  -1.187 -1.152 0.655  0.438 
COMP  -0.158** -0.158** -0.038  -0.058 
  -2.28 -2.26 -0.567  -0.84 
EMP   -0.013   0.108 
  -0.159   1.329 
Industry 
Dummies  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
R2  0.102 0.102 0.071 0.099 
Figures below estimated coefficient are t statistics, * denotes significance of 10% level, ** at 5% 
level and *** at 1% level      20
 
 
Table 4   Performance Equations: Exports and Export Growth 
  Exports (EXP) 
Change in 
Exports (DEX) 
Change in 
Exports to the 
West (DEX1) 
  (1) (2) (1)  (1) 
DN  0.162* 0.26***  0.284  0.707 
  1.806 2.683 0.927  1.429 
PF  0.081 0.106 -0.019  0.041 
  0.747 0.946 -0.051  0.08 
PF1  0.019 0.071 0.471  -0.674 
  0.203 0.712 1.285  -0.88 
MAN  0.067 0.07  -0.127  -0.018 
  0.96 0.993  -0.52  -0.043 
GEO  -0.275*** -0.251*** -0.761***  -0.694* 
  -4.154 -3.654 -3.65  -1.878 
LOS  -0.204*** -0.163**  -0.232  -0.253 
  -3.25 -2.531  -1.145  -0.765 
JV  0.014 -0.013  -0.449  -0.052 
  0.233 -0.224  -1.586  -0.122 
SBC  0.144* 0.129* 0.297  0.344 
  1.769 1.953 0.831  0.85 
SBC2  0.17** 0.114* 0.246  .622* 
  2.555 1.678 1.117  1.695 
COMP  0.082 0.111*  0.121  0.133 
  1.445 1.93  0.618  0.402 
Industry 
Dummies  Yes*** Yes*** Yes***  Yes*** 
EMP   0.257***  0.000***  0.000** 
  3.785  2.736 2.455 
Figures below estimated coefficient are t statistics, * denotes significance of 10% level, ** at 5% 
level and *** at 1% level.   21
 
 
 
Table 5    Performance Equations: Productivity and Employment Growth 
 
Productivity 
Growth (DSL) 
Employment Growth            
(DEMP) 
  (1) (1)  (2) 
DN  -0.66** 0.074  0.092 
  -2.256 0.73  0.873 
PF  -0.116 0.053  0.062 
  -0.317 0.437  0.5 
PF1  -0.252 0.27**  0.277** 
  -0.718 2.533  2.579 
MAN  -0.213 -0.141*  -0.142* 
  -0.921 -1.754  -1.764 
GEO  -0.115 0.031  0.032 
  -0.562 0.415  0.427 
LOS  -.340* 0.065  0.073 
  -1.732 0.939  1.041 
JV  -0.107 -0.01  -0.013 
  -0.392 -0.161  -0.198 
SBC  0.357 -0.041  -0.047 
  1.058 -0.578  -0.653 
SBC2  0.576*** -0.066  -0.072 
  2.716 -0.898  -0.977 
COMP  0.236 -0.018  -0.02 
  1.285 -0.287  -0.321 
EMP  0   0.047 
 0.831  0.635 
Industry 
Dummies Yes***  Yes***  Yes*** 
R2   0.129  0.13 
Figures below estimated coefficient are t statistics, * denotes significance of 10% level, ** at 5% 
level and *** at 1% level.   22
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